

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 14, 2015

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending August 14, 2015

Savannah River National Laboratory: The staff conducted a review of the Savannah River National Laboratory upgraded Documented Safety Analysis and Technical Safety Requirements. In response to site rep comments, SRNL developed videos to train workers on the use of manual Halon™ glovebox fire suppression systems and is planning to conduct drills on their use.

Readiness Assessments (RA): DOE sent SRNS a letter identifying several issues with recent 235-F and H-Canyon RAs: less than adequate determination of readiness, inadequate closure of pre-start corrective actions, improper classification of opportunities for improvement, inadequate preparation by the assessors, and repeat issues in conduct of operations and training. DOE directed SRNS to perform a causal analysis and develop a corrective action plan to raise the standard of performance in readiness preparation, performance of the RA, and effectiveness of corrective actions. Until all corrective actions are fully implemented and validated by DOE, SRNS is not allowed to conduct any further RAs until DOE concurs. (See 7/31/15 report). The site rep observed dry runs and interviews for the contractor's L-Area RA. (DOE previously approved the start of this RA). The RA team performed additional interviews after receiving negative feedback on the team's conduct of some of the earlier level-of-knowledge interviews.

Saltstone: This week, SRR shut down two of the grout runs early due to a glycerin leak from a grout pump head and a grout pump variable frequency drive fault. In the latter case, a couple dozen gallons of waste ended up in the Saltstone hopper overflow container.

Defense Waste Processing Facility: The draft Justification for Continued Operations requires direct addition of antifoam to tanks to prevent the dilution that can lead to antifoam degradation and increased flammable gas generation. In response to a site rep question, SRR will implement a modification to disable the current antifoam addition system that causes this antifoam dilution. The site rep also observed an evaluated emergency preparedness (EP) exercise involving a simulated tornado that damaged the cooling water tower fans and causes a formic acid leak. As part of their EP program corrective actions (see 7/17/15 report), SRR conducted training on roles and responsibilities for the controllers and evaluators beforehand, implemented a new template for controllers to grade objectives, and tried to improve the overall rigor of the exercise. SRR is still conducting their evaluation of the performance during the exercise.

Technical Reference Procedures: According to the SRS conduct of operations manual, "Technical reference procedures are procedures that describe routine activities or provide generalized instruction." Reference procedures may be performed from memory and do not need to be present in the field while work is completed. The site rep identified that some reference procedures contain warning statements, which are used to attract attention to preclude loss of life, personal injury, or health hazards. However, the manual states that Use-Every-Time procedures should be used when an error could result in unacceptable conditions. The site rep discussed this observation with members of the SRS conduct of operations committee.